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Administrative Law 
by Wiley W. Manuel* 
In the period from October 1967 to October 1968, the 
field of administrative law has continued to receive attention 
by the appellate courts. In the area of case law the emphasis 
in the past year has centered on proceedings held by the 
Department of Motor Vehicles arising out of the so-called im-
plied consent law. 1 These cases have resulted in refinements 
in the statement of certain constitutional principles, the recog-
nition of newer methods to promote traffic safety, and more 
definitive applications of administrative law concepts. 
In the field of legislation, although many statutes were 
passed affecting administrative agencies, most of the enact-
ments deal with the substantive problems with which par-
"A.B. 1951 University of California, 
Berkeley. LL.B. 1953, University of 
California, Hastings College of the 
Law. Deputy Attorney General, State 
of California. Member, California 
State Bar. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to Richard Adler, student at Golden 
Gate College, School of Law, for assist-
ance in preparation of this article. 
The views expressed in this article are 
those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the California At-
torney General's Office. 
1. Cal. Vehicle Code § 13353. 
CAL LAW 1969 297 
1
Manuel: Administrative Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Administrative Law 
ticular agencies are concerned. As such, they are not proper 
subjects for this article, which is intended to give a somewhat 
comprehensive review of the developments in administrative 
law generally. 
The legislature, by enactment of an administrative discovery 
bill, and by a reworking of the statutes relating to access to 
public records attempted in 1968 to provide methods in the 
proper setting for obtaining information from state agencies. 
It is in this field of access to information that the legislature 
has perhaps had its greatest impact on administrative law 
throughout this last year. 
Legislation 
Administrative Discovery 
For a number of years, the question of availability of dis-
covery in administrative law has been open to debate. In an 
unreported superior court case, attempts at taking a deposition 
of persons complaining to the Real Estate Commissioner were 
denied. 2 The Administrative Procedure Ace has clearly pro-
vided that depositions are available in administrative pro-
ceedings governed by that act,4 only where there is a showing 
that a witness sought to be deposed will be unable or cannot 
be compelled to attend at the time and place of the hearing, 
and accordingly, most attempts at depositions fail. 
In the landmark case of Shively v. Stewart,5 the California 
Supreme Court had before it a proceeding in mandamus in 
which two doctors, accused of performing or arranging for 
the abortions of several women, requested the following from 
the administrative agency: (1) the statements of the abortees 
and their husbands; (2) all statements made by the doctors 
in the hands of the Board of Medical Examiners, including 
copies of hospital records, billings, etc.; and (3) the investi-
gation reports made by the investigators for the board. The 
2. Labat v. Real Estate Commis-
sioner, San Francisco Superior Court 
No. 525696. 
3. Cal. Government Code §§ 11500 
et seq. 
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5. 65 Cal.2d 475, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 
421 P.2d 65 (1966). See also Cal Law 
-Trends and Del'elopmenls 1967, p. 
318. 
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court, noting the existence of discovery in most civil and 
criminal practice and the seriousness of the matter, rendered 
its decision and order whereby it made available the state-
ments of the abortees and their husbands, and the statements 
of the doctors. Curiously enough, in ordering the issuance 
of the peremptory writ of mandate, the court confined itself 
to the first two categories and did not order the board to make 
available a subpoena duces tecum for the latter purpose, com-
menting that the investigation reports themselves were not 
available except on a showing of good cause. Shively also 
has been interpreted as not permitting either the taking of 
depositions of witnesses or interrogatories of the agency ad-
ministrators.6 
After Shively, attempts were made to enact administrative 
discovery legislation, some codifying Shively, some narrower 
and some broader. 7 
In 1968, at the early meetings of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, the Committee indicated that parties interested in 
producing a discovery bill should come together, work out 
their differences and give the legislature the benefit of a bill 
fully explored by those most interested. Accordingly, through-
out the spring of 1968, representatives from the Attorney 
General's Office, the State Bar, the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, the Office of Administrative Procedure, and 
the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards 
met and drafted Senate Bill 833. The bill was produced and 
introduced by Senator Stephens from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and was then enacted as Chapter 808 of the 
Statutes of 1968. The law, in essence, is a records discovery 
law. 
It was realized by all parties participating that perhaps one 
of the hallmarks of administrative law is expeditious and 
easily understood process. Accordingly, the statute was an 
attempt to give the parties to an administrative proceeding 
as much information as possible in the simplest possible way. 
The information was made available as a matter of right 
6. Everett v. Gordon, 266 Cal. App. 
2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968). 
7. See Cal Law-Trends and Devel-
opments 1967, p. 319. 
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and upon request with no showing of good cause required. 
A layman could ask for the information as well as a lawyer, 
and since proceedings before administrative agencies may 
find respondents unrepresented by council, the bill amended 
section 11504 of the Government Code to advise the parties 
to the proceedings through the statement to respondent of the 
right to discovery and further required that copies of the 
pertinent sections of the Government Code embodying the 
discovery procedure accompany the statement to respondent. 
Section 11507.5 was added by this statute to the Govern-
ment Code to provide that the discovery law would provide 
the exclusive right and method of discovery as to any pro-
ceedings governed by that chapter. Obviously, the intent 
of the legislature and the authors of the bill was to forestall any 
more experimentation in this area and to make it clear that 
the legislative procedure was exclusive. 
The statute added section 11507.6 to the Government 
Code, which section contains the most important provision 
of the act. It provides that after the initiation of an ad-
ministrative proceeding, a party, upon written request made 
to any other party prior to the hearing and within 30 days 
after service of the initial pleading or within 15 days after 
service of any additional pleadings, is entitled (1) to obtain 
the names and addresses of witnesses to the extent known by 
the other party, including, but not limited to those, intended to 
be called to testify at the hearing and (2) to inspect and make 
copies of any of the following in the possession or custody or 
control of the other parties: 
(a) A statement of a person, other than the respond-
ent, named in the initial administrative pleading, or in 
any additional pleading, when it is claimed that the 
act or omission of the respondent as to such person is 
the basis for the administrative proceeding; 
(b) A statement pertaining to the subject matter of 
the proceeding made by any party to another party or 
person; 
(c) Statements of witnesses then proposed to be called 
by the party and of other persons having personal knowl-
300 CAL LAW 1969 
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edge of the acts, admissions or events which are the 
basis for the proceeding, not included in (a) or (b) 
above; 
(d) All writings, including but not limited to re-
ports of mental, physical and blood examinations and 
things which the party then proposes to offer in evi-
dence; 
(e) Any other writing or thing which is relevant and 
which would be admissable in evidence; 
(f) Investigative reports made by or on behalf of the 
agency or other party pertaining to the subject matter 
of the proceeding, to the extent that such reports (1) 
contain the names and addresses of witnesses or of per-
sons having personal knowledge of the acts, admissions 
or events which are the basis for the proceeding, or (2) 
reflect matters perceived by the investigator in the course 
of his investigation, or (3) contain or include by attach-
ment any statement or writing described in (a) to (e), 
inclusive, or summary thereof. 
It may be noted the first class of information subject to in-
spection, (a) above, embodies the first class of material which 
was to be made discoverable by Shively, i.e., the statements 
of the abortees and their husbands. Normally we can classify 
these people as the victims or persons sought to be protected 
by the law. In a disciplinary case involving an action against 
a contractor, for example, it would include any statements 
made by any of the other contracting parties with whom the 
contractor contracted or owed a duty as a contractor. In 
the case of a liquor licensee involving serving of liquor 
to a minor, it would include the statement of the named 
minor. 
The statement pertaining to the subject matter of the pro-
ceeding made by any party to any other party or person in 
(b) above, essentially involves the second class of material 
made available in the Shively case and includes the admissions 
of the parties. The language of the act is broad enough to 
include, in the case of a third party accusation or third party 
protest to the issuance of a license, the admissions of the third 
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party, thus allowing the protestants to get the admissions of 
the persons seeking the license. 
With respect to investigatory reports, the third kind of dis-
coverable material involved in the Shively case, the act in-
tended to make these investigation reports available so long as 
they contained matters which were otherwise discoverable 
under the other provisions of the act so that the investigation 
report may not be a shelter which would keep the matter 
hidden. Also, where the investigators were percipient wit-
nesses to the events material to the case, their investigation 
reports would be made available to any other witnesses. The 
act intended, however, to restrict access to those parts of the 
investigation report which were nothing more than opinions 
of the investigator, or were analyses of other witnesses. It 
was believed that there would be an area of confidence be-
tween the investigator and his supervisor and, except to the 
extent that the investigation would otherwise cover discover-
able material, the investigator should be free to express his 
recommendations knowing that his investigation report would 
not be the subject of discovery. In this respect, the act recog-
nizes the usual privileges against disclosure, including the 
rules involving the attorney's work product. 
The matter of enforcement of discovery rights has been 
considered. In Shively, the supreme court perhaps, more by 
ipse dixit than by sound reasoning, held that the courts pro-
vided the best and sole forum to decide discovery rights. In 
doing so it completely disregarded the concept of adminis-
trative remedies. The framers of the legislation in question 
have more or less followed the supreme court's lead, for it 
was thought that if there is going to be any controversy over 
discovery, it should be quickly resolved. It was further 
thought that there probably would be little chance of getting 
a bill passed which denied access to the courts prior to the 
final adjudication of the case. Accordingly, section 11507.7 
was added to the Government Code to provide that a person 
who does not get the discovery sought can, within 15 days 
after the respondent party first evidenced his failure to comply 
or within 30 days after the request for discovery was made 
and the party has failed to reply to the request, whichever 
302 CAL LAW 1969 
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period is longer, file in the superior court in the county where 
the proceeding is pending, a petition to compel discovery. The 
court, if satisfied from the reading of the petition that it sets 
forth good cause for relief, must issue an order to show cause 
directed to the respondent party; otherwise the court must 
enter an order denying the petition. Theoretically, the super-
ior court is charged with the duty to consider the petition 
thoughtfully and it is expected that the order to show cause 
should not automatically issue merely because the petition 
seeks it. 
The order to show cause is to be served upon the party 
by certified mail, and the order is returnable no earlier than 
10 days after the date issued and no later than 30 days after 
the filing of the petition. During the time the matter is 
pending in the courts, the administrative proceeding is stayed 
if a copy of the order to show cause is filed with the Office 
of Administrative Procedure forthwith upon issuance. If it 
is contended that any matter sought is not discoverable under 
the law or is privileged, the court may order the matter filed 
for in camera examination by the court. The decision of the 
court is not reviewable by appeal, but rather by a mandamus 
proceeding in the appellate court. 
It is clear that the statute provides the party seeking dis-
covery with the right to obtain tangible matter; but neither 
depositions nor interrogatories are available. Because of its 
placement these discovery provisions will affect only those 
proceedings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Access to Public Records-The California Public 
Records Act 
Next in importance to the provisions of the administrative 
discovery statute are the provisions of Chapter 1473, Cali-
fornia Statutes of 1968, regulating access to public records. 
This chapter adds section 6250 to 6260 (Chapter 3.5 of 
Division 7 of Title 1) to the Government Code and amends 
and repeals other provisions of the various codes. The addi-
tion to the code is entitled the "California Public Records 
Act." 
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The statute defines public records and provides for the 
public's right of access to them. Section 6252 is added to the 
Code to define state agency, local agency, person and public 
records. Public records are defined to include papers, maps, 
magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films, prints, magnetic 
or punch cards, discs, drums or other documents containing 
information relating to the conduct of the public's business 
prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local 
agency regardless of physical form or characteristic. Appar-
ently, the statute was looking ahead, not only considering the 
printed word but also considering information stored in 
memory banks and other apparatus which are part of com-
puterized and data processing systems. The statute, by addi-
tion of section 6253 to the Code, makes public records open 
to inspection at all times during office hours of the state or local 
agency and states further that every citizen has the right to 
inspect any public record, except as otherwise provided in 
the bill. The agency may, however, adopt regulations stating 
the procedures to be followed in making these records avail-
able in accordance with the section. 
There are certain records which are not required to be dis-
closed. They follow somewhat expected patterns and are 
covered by Government Code section 6254 subsections (a) 
through (m). 
Subsection (a) precludes disclosure of intra or inter-agency 
memoranda not retained by the public agency in the regular 
course of business, provided the public interest in withholding 
such records fairly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 
Among other matters precluded from disclosure by the 
statute are: recordings pertaining to pending litigation; dis-
closures constituting invasion of personal privacy, such as 
medical files; trade secrets; investigations of the Attorney 
General's Office and Justice Department; and confidential tax 
information, as well as many other matters which by nature 
are confidential. 
In order for an agency to withhold any of its records, sec-
tion 6255 of the Code provides that agencies shall demon-
strate that the records are exempt under the express provisions 
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of the chapter or that on the facts of the particular case, the 
public interest served by not making the record public clearly 
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure. 
Section 6256 provides that any person may receive a copy 
of an identifiable public record or shall be provided with a 
copy of all information contained therein. Computer data 
shall be provided in a form determined by the agency. Section 
6257 allows the agency to recoup the cost of making a copy 
of an identifiable record or for producing information in the 
form of a certified copy of such a record. 
A person who is aggrieved by any action of an agency by 
withholding the information may, under section 6258, in-
stitute proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction 
to enforce the right to receive a copy of the public record. 
As in the case of the administrative discovery statute, if 
there is a question of the confidentiality or the right to see 
the particular document, the court may have the document 
presented to it and examine the record in camera if permitted 
by subdivision (b) of section 915 of the Evidence Code. 
Section 6260 of the Government Code indicates that the pro-
visions of the chapter shall not be deemed to affect in any 
manner the status of judicial records as the same existed prior 
to the effective date of the section, nor to affect the rights of 
litigants, including parties to administrative proceedings, under 
the discovery laws of the state. 
Treatment of Electronic Data Processing Systems 
An area which should be the focus of legislation in the 
years to come is that of computers and data processing, given 
the great technological advancements prevalent in that area 
today. 
The legislature really has not fully come to grips with 
treating the data processing systems material in the same 
way that it has, for example, microfilming. 8 In 1968, the 
legislature, by Chapter 1062, amended section 1806 of the 
8. Cal. Government Code §§ 12263, 
12264. 
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Vehicle Code and made its first attempt at providing for the 
admissibility of information stored in electronic data proc-
essing systems by providing as follows: 
At its discretion the department may file and maintain 
these accident reports and abstracts by electronic re-
cording and storage media and after transcribing elec-
tronically all available data from the accident reports 
and abstracts of conviction may destroy the original 
documents, except in cases where this code requires man-
datory action against a person's driving privilege upon 
the receipt of such abstracts or reports. Notwithstanding 
any other provisions of law, the recorded facts from any 
electronic recording and storage device maintained by 
the department shall constitute evidence of such facts 
in any administrative actions instituted by the depart-
ment. [Department of Motor Vehicles] 
It wiII be interesting to see how this section, although re-
lating to admissibility in administrative proceedings conducted 
by the Department of Motor Vehicles only, will operate in 
practice, there being very little experience in California at the 
present time with regard to the admissibility of data stored 
in electronic devices. The method of assuring the authenticity 
and completeness of the records should attract the curiosity 
of the profession, because the matter of retrieved data being 
presented in evidence wiII be of interest to all litigants in the 
future, whether they are administrative agencies, public or 
private entities, or individuals. 
Case Law-Procedure 
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
Methods of Review. Judicial review of the adjudicatory 
decisions of most administrative agencies, state or local, is 
provided for in section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
During the year there has been some spotlight on other 
methods of judicial review available because of special circum-
stances. In Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs 
306 CAL LAW 1969 
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for the Blind,9 the court was presented with an appeal from 
a declaratory relief judgment. Apparently, a party may secure 
a declaration as to his right under a particular statute, in-
cluding a determination of whether the statute is constitutional 
where the declaratory action is brought prior to the institution 
of any administrative action by the agency. The court held 
that the subsequent bringing of disciplinary proceedings 
against the plaintiff did not require the plaintiff to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before maintaining an action in court. 
The sequence of events is important because where the ad-
ministrative proceeding precedes the filing of the civil action, 
the plaintiff will have to exhaust his administrative remedies 
before he may petition the courtS.l0 
Being somewhat vexed by the time consumed in reviewing 
decisions of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
the legislature in 1967 enacted provisions in the Business and 
Professions Code to remove the superior court from the 
process of reviewing the decisions of that department. Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeal and the supreme court now have 
jurisdiction over such matters. Samson Market Co. v. Kirby,Il 
was one of the first cases to arise under the new legislation.12 
Although the case was not one in which judicial review in the 
usual sense was sought from a quasi-judicial determination of 
the department, it is instructive in that it shows quite clearly 
that whether review is sought from such a decision or relief is 
sought in the courts to compel the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control to do any particular act with respect to its 
operations, the superior courts no longer have control and 
that any relief sought, including mandate, must come from 
the appellate cour!s. 
Scope of Review-Independent Judgment Test v. Sub-
stantial Evidence Rule. On the question of scope of review, 
the courts have generally continued to observe the existing 
9. 67 Cal.2d 536, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21, 
432 P.2d 717 (1967). 
10. 67 Cal.2d at 543, 544, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. at 26, 27, 432 P.2d at 722-723; 
Walker v. Munro, 178 Cal. App.2d 67, 
2 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960). 
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 577, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 130 (1968), app. dismd. 393 U.S. 
II, 21 L.Ed.2d 18, 89 S.Ct. 49. 
12. Cal. Business & Professions Code 
§ 23090.5. 
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rules and have applied some of those rules to novel situations. 
Perhaps one of the best recapitulations of the rules defining 
the scope of judicial review is contained in Beverly Hills Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court. l3 There the 
court noted that prior to 1936, the substantial evidence rule 
was invoked to review the decisions of any administrative 
agency, but since that time and by virtue of Standard Oil Co. 
v. Board of Equalization,14 the writ of certiorari was abolished 
with respect to state-wide administrative agencies exercising 
mere legislatively delegated powers. The court noted that 
after the Standard Oil case the courts evolved the limited trial 
de novo which was not a complete retrial of the case before the 
administrative agency but rather a qualified form of review 
with the superior court exercising its independent judgment 
on the evidence presented to the agency. The court noted 
too that the matter of the limited trial de novo or the in-
dependent judgment cases was limited to the situation where 
the agency was not exercising constitutionally given powers 
and where a vested right was involved. Hence, in a case 
where a vested right was not involved, the independent judg-
ment test did not apply, and the scope of review of the evi-
dence was limited to ascertaining whether the action of the 
agency was supported by substantial evidence. The court 
noted that there had been those kinds of cases over the years 
where a state-wide administrative agency's decision would be 
reviewed by the substantial evidence rule where a vested 
right was not involved. Among the situations involving a 
nonvested right would be the denial of a permit, as in M cDon-
ough v. Goodcell/5 and the application for old age benefits, 
as in Bertch v. Social Welfare Department. l6 
In the Beverly Hills Savings case, mandamus action was filed 
not by the applicant for a license, but rather by one who was 
protesting the issuance of the license. The court held that 
such a person had no vested right to prevent the other in-
dividual from getting the license and hence the scope of re-
13. 259 Cal. App.2d 306, 66 Cal. 15. 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035, 
Rptr. 183 (1968). 123 A.L.R. 1205 (1939). 
14. 6 Cal.2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936). 16. 45 Cal.2d 524, 289 P.2d 485 
(1955). 
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view was the substantial evidence test. The court, however, 
went further and in applying the doctrine to the case, deter-
mined that all that the petitioner was entitled to was to have 
the court determine whether the commission's action was sup-
ported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record, 
and this meant that the petitioner was not entitled to various 
forms of discovery sought in the trial court.17 The court noted 
further that substantial evidence did not mean that the superior 
court had to review the entire record to determine whether 
there was substantial evidence, but rather that the substan-
tiality of the evidence is determined by isolating and con-
sidering only the evidence supporting the administrative action 
in accordance with the usual rule applied in reviewing the 
decisions of trial courts by the appellate courts. This being 
the rule, the court then held that where the protestant com-
plained that there was evidence dehors the record which was 
considered by the commissioner, if the evidence were favor-
able to the decision, it could not be considered since it was 
outside the record, and if the evidence were not favorable to 
the decision it could only raise a conflict in the evidence. 
The court in County of Madera v. Holcomb,18 determined 
that a limited trial de novo was not available to a petitioner 
for public assistance who sought review of the Welfare De-
partment's decision denying him aid, there being no vested 
right of review which would warrant a trial de novo, as the 
court pointed out in the Beverly Hills case. 
The matter of the limited trial de novo or independent 
judgment test does not apply to agencies exercising powers 
granted to them by the State Constitution. Thus when the 
court is confronted with a decision involving the Department 
of Alcoholic Beverage Control, an agency created by Article 
XX, section 22 of the Constitution, the courts are dealing with 
an agency that has constitutional power to adjudicate its 
17. In light of § 11507.5 added to 
the Government Code by Chapter 808 
of California Statutes of 1968, it would 
appear that discovery would not be 
available in the superior court on review 
of any agency's decision where the 
agency was operating pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (Cal. 
Gov. Code §§ 11500-11523). 
18. 259 Cal. App.2d 226, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 428 (1968). 
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cases. The court's scope of review then is to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision 
of the agency. Where the Constitution has vested in the 
agency discretion to determine whether good cause exists for 
the revocation of the license, the agency, not the court, deter-
mines whether good cause exists for denying or revoking a 
given license on the grounds that its issuance would be con-
trary to public welfare and morals. The court, however, de-
termines whether the agency acted arbitrarily in making this 
decision. Thus, in Kirhy v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Ap-
peals Board/9 the court determined that the department acted 
properly in denying a license to a liquor establishment in 
proximity to a school. 
Even where the scope of review requires use of the sub-
stantial evidence test, the supreme court, in Huntley v. Public 
Utilities C0n1l11ission,20 determined that the findings of the 
administrative agency may not be final on constitutional ques-
tions although this does not mean that the court should dis-
regard the weight properly to be attached to findings of an 
agency after a hearing and the taking of evidence. Accord-
ingly, where the Public Utilities Commission had modified and 
approved schedules requiring record-method subscribers to in-
clude in the recording the names of the individuals responsible 
for the message, the court held this ruling violative of First 
Amendment freedoms. 
As the court in the Beverly Hills Savings case indicated, the 
interest of the petitioner will determine essentially the type of 
review obtainable. Likewise, in Artigues v. California Depart-
ment of El11ploYl11ent/ the court of appeal had to define the 
right to unemployment benefits provided by the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act in order to determine whether these were 
property rights within the meaning of the term as used in cases 
requiring a limited trial de novo. The court held the petitioner 
had such a claim. The case also stands for the proposition 
19. 261 Cal. App.2d 119, 67 Cal. cussion of this case, see Leahy, CON-
Rptr. 628 (1968). STITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
20. 69 Cal.2d 67. 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 1. 259 Cal. App.2d 409, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
442 P.2d 685 (1968). For further dis- 390 (1968). 
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that although the trial court may engage in a limited trial 
de novo and exercise its independent judgment as to what 
facts are based on the evidence in the record, the court can-
not ignore the undisputed facts in the record. A judgment 
rendered contrary to the undisputed facts in the record will 
bring about a reversal in such a case. 
Again, following along the lines of Beverly Hills Federal 
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court, the court in Western 
Airlines Inc. v. Schutzbank,2 indicated that where there was no 
vested right involved, the scope of review required the court 
to look for substantial evidence. This meant only that the 
trial court could not exercise its independent judgment as to 
the evidence and that the findings of the agency must be up-
held if supported by credible and competent evidence. For 
reasons not clearly defined in the opinion, the petitioner 
was able to convince the trial court that out of the single issue 
of whether there was substantial evidence to support the 
findings of the commissioner, two issues could be developed. 
One of these was whether there was substantial evidence to 
support the findings; the other was whether the order was 
supported by the entire record. Because of the so-called 
"twin issue" and in spite of the language in Western Air Lines 
lJ. Sobieski,3 to which petitioner was also a party, telling the 
trial court that it could only look for substantial evidence, 
the petitioner argued to the court of appeal that the trial court 
was not bound by the findings and could make its own find-
ings contrary to the commissioner's. Support was sought in 
such cases as Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners,4 and 
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners. s For these cases to 
apply, however, the law would have to be changed so as to 
give the trial court power to redetermine the weight of the 
evidence in a case where no vested rights are involved. The 
point having been so clearly spelled out in Sobieski, it seems 
2. 258 Cal. App.2d 218, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3. 191 Cal. App.2d 399, 12 Cal. 
293 (1968). For further discussion of Rptr. 719 (1961). 
this case, see Bader, BUSINESS ASSOCIA- 4. 68 Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 
TlONS, in this volume. 435 P.2d 553 (1968). 
5. 32 Cal.2d 301, 196 P.2d 20 (1948). 
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incredible that it would be the subject of extensive litigation 
in Western Airlines Inc. v. Schutzbank. 
The rule was stated in Thompson v. City of Long Beach,s 
that a trial court, in a case where it is reviewing according to 
the substantial evidence test, is bound to disregard the evi-
dence contrary to that received in support of the findings of 
the agency. The court in Ferguson v. Kern County Water 
Agency,7 relied on such a rule when dealing with a local ad-
ministrative agency to which the scope of review was the sub-
stantial evidence test. This rule was also involved in DeLucia 
v. County of Merced,s where the petitioner attempted to get 
a trial de novo to settle questions of fact before the superior 
court where the appellate court indicated that the taxpayer 
had no such right. The only issue properly before the trial 
court was whether there was evidence of sufficient substantial-
ity before the local agency to justify its findings. 
The term "limited trial de novo" should not conjure up in 
the mind of the practitioner visions of introducing new evi-
dence at the mandamus level. Traditionally, the courts have 
treated the matter of the limited trial de novo as being akin 
to a qualified review, as commented upon in the Beverly Hills 
Savings case. 
A concrete application of this doctrine is found in Shakin 
v. Board of Medical Examiners,9 where the Board of Medical 
Examiners, a non-constitutional agency, sought to revoke a 
doctor's license to practice medicine and surgery in the State 
of California, a vested right. The court pointed out that in 
order for the petitioner to be entitled to introduce additional 
evidence for the trial court's consideration in a mandamus 
proceeding, it must appear that he could not, in the exercise 
of diligence, have obtained and introduced such evidence to 
the board, or that such evidence was improperly excluded at 
6. 41 Cal.2d 235 at 241, 259 P.2d Goodman, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, in 
649 at 652 (1953). this volume. 
7. 254 Cal. App.2d 908, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9. 254 Cal. App.2d 102, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
698 (1967). 274 (1967) citing Schoenen v. State 
8. 257 Cal. App.2d 620, 65 Cal. Board of Medical Examiners, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 177 (1968). For a further dis- App.2d 909, 913-914, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
cussion of this case, see Sabine and 364, 367-368 (1966). 
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the hearing. In this connection, the announcement of the 
court was certainly in accord with Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1094.5, subdivision (d). This provision of the code 
was intended, and was traditionally so recognized by the courts 
even before the adoption of section 1094.5, to make sure that 
the licensee did not simply make a perfunctory or skeletal 
showing before the administrative agency with the expectation 
of making a fuller showing before the court on review. The 
rule is part of the concept of exhausting administrative 
remedies-to be discussed later-which also implies that 
a party present all legitimate issues before the administrative 
tribunal, ". In order to preserve the integrity of the 
proceeding before that body and to endow it with the dignity 
beyond that of mere shadow play."lo 
Of course, in those situations where the limited trial de 
novo rule applies and the trial court can exercise its inde-
pendent judgment, the rule since Moran v. Board of Medical 
Examiners, requires the appellate court to sustain the trial 
court if the trial court's findings are supported by credible and 
competent evidence. ll 
While there have been many cases throughout the year 
dealing with the scope of review of adjudicatory decisions 
of administrative agencies, perhaps cases decided during the 
year that are most helpful are those dealing with review of the 
rule-making powers of administrative agencies because these 
decisions have tended to sharpen and focus the scope of review 
and to delineate the power and responsibility of the courts 
in these matters. 
At the outset it should be noted that adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial functions of administrative bodies can be likened to 
courtlike activities while rule-making or quasi-judicial func-
tions are analogous to the dealings of a legislative body. This 
is an important distinction because the reviewing court's treat-
ment of the two is quite different. 
10. Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Appeals Board, 197 Cal. App. 
2d 182, 187, 17 Cal. Rptr. 167, 170 
(1961). 
11. See Yakov v. Board of Medical 
Examiners 68 Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
785, 435 P.2d 553 (1968). (Decision of 
supreme court upholding judgment of 
trial court reversing agency.) 
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In Ralph's Grocery v. Reimel,12 the court had before it a 
rule of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control which 
sought to prohibit manufacturers, importers, and wholesalers 
of beer from getting discounts for quantity purchases. The 
question was whether this rule was within the authority dele-
gated to the department to promulgate rules that foster and 
encourage the orderly wholesale marketing and wholesale dis-
tribution of beer. The court held that in determining whether a 
specific rule falls within the coverage of the delegated power, 
the sole function of the court was to decide whether the depart-
ment reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate. The 
court recognized that while final responsibility for the interpre-
tation of the law rested with the courts, the courts could not 
exercise an independent judgment on what constituted promo-
tion of orderly wholesale marketing and distribution. Hence, 
there is an area of discretion carved out which restricts the 
courts to the question of whether the action of the agency 
was consistent with the statutory purpose. The court noted 
too, that in reaching the conclusion that the rule was not 
arbitrary or capricious, it was not obliged to concern itself 
with alternative methods of regulation available to the de-
partment. The court noted that only in the field of restriction 
of fundamental constitutional rights would the court be con-
cerned with the existence of such alternative methods, citing 
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital D istrict. 13 The 
plaintiff in Ralph's Grocery also urged that only by an explicit 
expression by the legislature can the agency be delegated 
the power to engage in price fixing. The court noted, how-
ever, that on the authority of Wilke & Holzheiser Inc. v. 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,14 the prohibition 
of discounts was not price fixing. This view seems clearly to 
undermine Schenley Industries Inc. v. Munro/5 where the 
court struck down a similar rule relating to distilled spirits, 
the rule being mentioned somewhat disapprovingly by the 
12. 69 Cal.2d 172, 70 Cal. Rptr. 407, 14. 65 Cal.2d 349, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 
444 P.2d 79 (1968). 420 P.2d 735 (1966). 
13. 65 Ca1.2d at 501-502, 55 Cal. 15. 237 Cal. App.2d 106, 46 Cal. 
Rptr at 403-404, 421 P.2d at 411-412 Rptr. 678 (1965). 
(1966). 
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supreme court. Administrative regulations cannot amend or 
alter a statute or enlarge its scope.16 
The question is often asked: what is the proper scope of 
review, i.e., need rules and regulations be supported by any 
factual material presented to the agency? With this question 
come the other questions relating to what kind of hearing 
the administrative agency must hold before it can adopt a 
rule or regulation. It has often been stated that there is no 
constitutional right to a hearing where an agency exercises 
its quasi-legislative function. Whatever procedural require-
ments there are for a hearing stem from the particular statute 
dealing with the agency rather than from any constitutional 
demands of due process. The case of Rivera v. Division of 
Industrial Welfare/7 set out the rules quite well. It indicated 
that where the procedural requirements governing the agency's 
quasi-legislative hearing fall somewhere between the extremes 
of purely argument type hearings, which do not provide oppor-
tunity for cross-examination and do allow independent investi-
gations outside the hearing process, and the strictly trial type 
of hearings, which require opportunity for cross-examination 
and rebuttal as well as confinement to the hearing records, such 
proceedings may exclude cross-examinations, need not provide 
access to the body of information from which the statistical 
compilations and summaries are drawn by the agency's staff, 
and may dispense with specific and detailed findings. If, 
however, the agency's staff brings in factual material not 
available to the public, the parties must be apprised of it 
during the hearing process, and cross-examination and rebuttal 
must be permitted. Thus, the statute dealing with the proce-
dure must be analyzed to determine its nature; and by the 
same token, court decisions, which seem to speak in terms of 
rights to cross-examine and the right to see certain evidence, 
should not be applied across the board to every type of quasi-
legislative hearing. The plaintiff should not attempt to have 
the reviewing court superimpose its own policy judgment but 
16. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal.2d 17. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 
733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697 739 (1968). 
(1967). 
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should try to establish that the action of the agency has been 
arbitrary. And with respect to a quasi-legislative decision 
like 'that of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the assailant 
has the burden of establishing that the commission's action 
had no evidentiary support. 
Because of the difference between the quasi-judicial process 
and the quasi-legislative process, it has been held that admin-
istrative mandamus, provided for in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1094.5, is not available to review the decisions of 
agency-adopted rules and regulations. It will be noted in 
passing that Government Code section 11440 has specifically 
provided the mechanism for review of the quasi-legislative 
acts of administrative agencies on the state level to the extent 
that they are governed by the quasi-legislative portions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 18 
The question of the time to seek judicial review pursuant 
to Government Code section 11523 and Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1094.5 now seems to be settled. Although 
dealing with a specific section of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, the court in Reimal v. House/ 9 indicated that 
the 30 days to seek review starts from the actual effective 
date of the decision of the agency and not from some mythical 
date earlier conjured as in the decision of Walters v. Con-
tractors' License Board.20 
Procedure at Administrative Hearings 
During the year, perhaps the most interesting case in the 
field of administrative hearing procedures was the case that 
extended the right to hearing to a person not normally thought 
of as being in a class of people entitled to a hearing or even 
over whom the agency had jurisdiction. In Endler v. Schutz-
bank,l the plaintiff, after a number of years in the finance 
18. Wilson v. Hidden Valley Munici-
pal Water Dis!., 256 Cal. App.2d 271, 
63 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1967). 
19. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 224 (1968). 
20. 229 Cal. App.2d 449, 40 Cal. 
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business, found himself unable to obtain employment because 
the Commissioner of Corporations had allegedly labeled him 
persona non grata, and threatened to bring disciplinary pro-
ceedings against any financial associations hiring him. Plain-
tiff had worked for a financial institution, and according to the 
description presented in the opinion of the supreme court, 
the institution had been advised to let plaintiff go. The 
institution was loath to do so. Later, disciplinary proceed-
ings were begun against the financial house and, finally, the 
plaintiff was dismissed. Two weeks later the proceedings 
against the financial institution were also dismissed. The 
commissioner had offered to conduct an informal hearing 
on the charges against the plaintiff with the understanding 
that any such informal hearing was not taken pursuant to 
any specified statute or statutory authority. The quest of the 
plaintiff was to find a way to protect his name and be able 
to meet the charges which the commissioner supposedly had 
against him. The court recognized that the right to employ-
ment was very valuable and suggested that although there 
was no precise administrative remedy provided, one could be 
improvised. The action of the court was based on the Four-
teenth Amendment insofar as it protects the pursuit of one's 
profession from abridgement by arbitrary state action. The 
case also recognized that the state had some right to regulate 
various people in the exercise of professions and callings and 
that the contours of due process in this connection would not 
necessarily always be the same. The court had cited a num-
ber of cases where persons' employment rights were termi-
nated without a hearing and then summed up the situation 
as follows: 
We thus reaffirm an elementary requirement of justice 
where we hold, as we do here, that the state may not 
make a man an outcast in his own profession without 
affording him a full opportunity to present his defense. 2 
There may be other agencies which are faced with this 
problem; for example, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
2. 68 Cal.2d at 173, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 
304, 436 P.2d at 304. 
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Control may revoke a license or discipline a licensee for 
employing a manager who does not have the same qualifica-
tions as the licensee.3 Perhaps the department in a situation 
like this may proceed in either of two fashions. In any action 
brought against a licensee for hiring an unqualified manager, 
the department could name the manager as a party respond-
ent and serve on him the necessary papers; he could participate 
or not participate in the hearing, as he wished, but at least 
he would have been afforded a hearing. On the other hand, 
when the question first arises whether a given person should 
be hired as a manager, the department could set up a hearing 
on a statement of issues4 and if any question is raised as to 
the jurisdiction of the department to proceed to hear the 
case, it might assert that while there is no statutory jurisdiction 
to hear the case, there might be a constitutional mandate, 
citing Endler v. Schutzbank. Other agencies may be faced 
with the same problem in the process of experimentation. 
Perhaps the answer to the problem posed by lack of legislative 
jurisdiction over the particular individual may be solved prag-
matically until such time as the legislature provides a hearing 
procedure or makes for inclusion into existing hearing proce-
dures. 
Throughout the year questions relating to the kind of evi-
dence admissible and to its effect once admitted were the 
subject of judicial discussion. Specifically, the issue of col-
lateral estoppel, which was raised by the decision of the 
supreme court in Teitelbaum Furs Inc. v. Dominion Insurance 
Co., Ltd.,s received much attention. 
Prior to Teitelbaum it had been held in Manning v. Watson,6 
that proof of a specific act SUbjecting a licensee to disciplinary 
action could not be proved simply by showing conviction for 
such act. The court held that such acts were hearsay. It 
would appear that on the basis of Teitelbaum the hearsay 
question would be removed and indeed, the conclusion that 
3. Cal. Business & Professions Code 5. 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 
§ 23788.5. 375 P.2d 439 (1962). 
4. Cal. Government Code § 11504. 6. 108 Cal. App.2d 705, 711, 239 
P.2d 688, 692 (1952). 
318 CAL LAW 1969 22
Cal Law Trends a d Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/13
Administrative Law 
the acts took place should be compelled. The courts, how-
ever, have not agreed upon that proposition. In the case of 
Richards v. Gordon,7 the court was dealing with a statute 
which provided that a final judgment in a civil action against 
a real estate licensee upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation 
or deceit with respect to transactions for which he is licensed 
gave the Real Estate Commissioner grounds for disciplining 
the licensee. In Richards, such a judgment was shown, yet 
the trial court attempted to annul the action of the Real Estate 
Commissioner. Apparently, at the administrative hearing 
there was an attempt to introduce evidence of an impeaching 
nature concerning the civil judgment, but the evidence was 
excluded. The court of appeal held that the document res 
judicata collaterally estopped the impeachment of the prior 
judgment, and citing such cases as Contractors' State License 
Board v. Superior Court,S and Bernhard v. Bank of America,9 
the court concluded: 
[T]he trial court erred in finding that respondent was 
not collaterally estopped from impeaching the prior find-
ings and judgment that fraud and deceit had been perpe-
trated by him in the [last] transaction.Io 
In Lundborg v. Director of the Department of Professional 
and Vocational Standards/1 the court was faced with a private 
investigator who had suffered a civil judgment against him, 
which essentially involved dishonesty or fraud. The judg-
ment, properly certified, was introduced into evidence along 
with the findings. There was no objection to the admission 
of these documents at the administrative hearing and, in fact, 
the parties had a discussion with regard to the matter at the 
hearing. The hearing officer indicated that he felt that the 
doctrine of res judicata barred the licensee from contesting 
the allegations that he had committed an act of dishonesty 
7. 254 Cal. App.2d 735, 62 Cal. 10. 254 Cal. App.2d at 742, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 466 (1967). Rptr. at 471. 
8. 187 Cal. App.2d 557, 10 Cal. Rptr. 11. 257 Cal. App.2d 141, 64 Cal. 
95 (1960). Rptr 650 (1967). 
9. 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 
(1942). 
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or fraud, and the licensee's attorney agreed that the hearing 
officer was bound by the judgment and announced his inten-
tion to limit his case to the facts in mitigation. As a result, 
the matter was tried and a decision of revocation was ren-
dered by the agency. Represented later by another attorney, 
the licensee went to court and secured from the superior court 
a judgment ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of 
mandate against the director of the department commanding 
him to annul the revocation order. The trial court held 
specifically that Lundborg had not committed any act of dis-
honesty or fraud in his relationship with the person involved 
in the civil judgment. The court of appeal, division two 
of the first district, held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
enunciated in Bernhard v. Bank of America, and Teitelbaum 
Furs Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., Ltd., had no place 
in the case and could not be invoked in the determination of 
the efficacy of the charge at the hearing. The court also 
relied in part on the case of Title v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service/2 where the court indicated that a prior denatural-
ization proceeding was not res judicata on the fact of the 
person's Communist affiliations in a subsequent deportation 
proceeding, the court noting some congressional intention that 
an alien would have a right to present evidence at each hearing 
to stave off the charges against him. 
The court, in Lundborg, merely bridged the gap between the 
federal case and the case at bar by stating that the hearing 
officer's application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel lim-
ited his consideration of the evidence to deprive the licensee 
of a full and complete hearing required by the statute. The 
court did note, however, cases in the real estate field dealing 
with the statute there involved and noted that there was no 
similar statute here making a prior civil judgment grounds 
for disciplinary proceedings. The court reasoned that if the 
prior judgment were to have this effect in the case before it, 
the legislature would have so indicated as it had done in the 
real estate field. 
Of interest to the practitioner beyond the point of collateral 
12. 322 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. [1963]). 
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estoppel is the court's reasoning that since the judge had erro-
neously exercised his discretion on the erroneous theory of 
collateral estoppel, he had not fully exhausted the use of his 
discretion and hence, the matter should be remanded to him 
for a proper hearing. 
The decision of the court in Lundborg received mild criti-
cism in McNeil's Inc. v. Contractors State License Board.13 
The court pointed out in a footnote: 
The opinion in Lundborg v. Director of the Department 
of Professional etc. Standards, supra, 257 Cal. App. 2d 
620, did not consider the decision in Contractors' State 
License Board v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. App. 2d 557, 
562 [10 Cal. Rptr. 95], approving the application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment in a contrac-
tor's license revocation proceeding.14 
Nevertheless, the court in McNeil's Inc., noted that the 
judgment introduced in evidence came in along with other 
evidence supporting the charges; the judgment did not stand 
alone as a basis for collateral estoppel. The decision in 
Lundborg, however, becomes a little bit more difficult to 
understand when one considers the case of Pathe v. City of 
Bakersfield/5 which recognized that a decision of the Indus-
trial Accident Commission may be binding on a pension board 
under the guise of res judicata. The court relied somewhat 
on the earlier case of French v. Rishell/6 which held that 
the doctrine of res judicata is applicable where the identical 
issue was decided in the prior case by a final judgment on the 
merits and the party against whom the plea is asserted is a 
party or privy to the party to a prior adjudication. It might 
be noted that in Gale v. State Board of Equalization,17 a deter-
mination of the Public Utilities Commission was held to col-
13. 262 Cal. App.2d 322, 68 Cal. 16. 40 Cal.2d 477. 254 P.2d 26 
Rptr. 640 (1968). (1953). 
14. 262 Cal. App.2d at 328, 68 Cal. 17. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cnl. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 644. 469 (1968). 
15. 255 Cal. App.2d 409, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 220 (1967). 
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laterally estop a taxpayer in his suit for refund of taxes filed 
against the Board of Equalization. 
Criminal Law and Related Problems and Their Effect on 
Administrative Procedure 
The courts of this state had occasion to consider Miranda 
v. Arizona/8 in an administrative law setting. No special 
effort is made here to explain the so-called Miranda decision 
other than to point out that in a criminal proceeding a person 
who has the focus of suspicion placed on him while in custody 
of a peace officer has the right to be told before being inter-
rogated and before answering questions that he has the right 
to remain silent; that he has the right to counsel; and that 
if he cannot afford counsel, one will be provided for him. 
The question has raged a bit over the application of these 
rights to a person who is being charged administratively. In 
the case of Mumford v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control,19 the licensee, relying on People v. Dorad020 (Cali-
fornia's anticipation of the Miranda case) contended that his 
admission was inadmissible because the record did not show 
that he was warned of his constitutional rights to silence and 
counsel as required by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States. The court held 
that the introduction into evidence of Mumford's admission 
did not deprive him of property without due process of law 
because his license to sell intoxicating liquors was not a pro-
prietary right within the meaning of due process. It will 
be noted that the court also disposed of his contention that 
the admission was inadmissible hearsay, the court reasoning 
that it was admissible as an admission by a party, an exception 
to the hearsay rule. Thus, the admission came in as direct 
evidence under Government Code section 11513, subdivision 
(c). It should be noted that the Miranda rule in the admin-
istrative law setting will be discussed later in the material 
relating to the subject of drivers' licenses and implied consent.1 
18. 384 U.S. 436. 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 20. 62 Cal.2d 338.42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 
86 S.C!. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). 398 P.2d 361 (1965). 
19. 258 Cal. App.2d 49, 65 Cal. 1. Cal. Vehicle Code § 13353. 
Rptr. 495 (1968). 
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Although it should come as no surprise, in Arenstein v. 
California State Board of Pharmacy,2 the court held that a 
plea of guilty in a criminal prosecution was admissible in the 
administrative proceeding to prove charges contained in the 
accusation. The court noted that although one may contest 
the truth of the matters admitted in his plea of guilty and 
may present all the facts surrounding the same including the 
nature of the charges, the plea, and the reason for entering 
such plea, it is probable that all adjudicatory proceedings 
are viewed at sometime by the judge or trier of fact in light 
of matters outside the record. As pointed out earlier in the 
case of Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior 
Court, the superior court dismissed the contention that the 
Savings & Loan Commissioner considered evidence outside 
the record. Based upon the court's consideration of what 
type of hearing the petitioner was entitled to the court deter-
mined that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing only to 
determine if there was substantial evidence in the record to 
support the decision of the agency. The court was not, how-
ever, inclined to concern itself with the contention that evi-
dence outside the record had been considered. 
In Shakin v. Board of Medical Examiners, the matter had 
been heard by the Board of Medical Examiners at a hearing. 
Evidence was taken, but subsequently a new hearing was held 
before a different hearing officer and at the second hearing 
the doctor appeared before the Medical Board with an attor-
ney for the first time. As a result of this hearing the doctor's 
license was revoked. It was his contention that his license 
had been revoked because of evidence that was introduced 
at the first hearing where he was not represented by counsel 
and that this evidence had had an adverse effect on the board 
at the second hearing. Among other things the court pointed 
out: 
Appellant contends that the Board rendered its decision 
on ex parte evidence since it retained the memory of the 
officer's testimony introduced at the earlier hearing. The 
2. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
357 (\968). 
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Board, however, adopted the hearing officer's proposed 
decision in its entirety; that decision rested completely 
upon the evidence adduced at the June 28 de novo 
hearing [the second hearing]. The hearing officer was 
not present at the earlier hearing and no resort to ex parte 
evidence of any sort occurred, as the trial court properly 
found. 3 
Administrative heads, as well as judges, are sometimes sub-
jected to the charge that they lean in a certain direction as 
far as law or the policy of the law is concerned. In Western 
Airlines v. Schutzbank, the contention was made that the 
commissioner was biased and prejudiced because he had a 
policy in favor of cumulative voting with respect to the election 
of voter-directors of corporations. The court pointed out that 
the fact that a hearing officer or judge believes or does not 
believe in the law which must be applied to evidence before 
him does not disqualify him or make him biased or prejudiced. 
The courts over the past year have also given some thought 
to the matter of evidence and, again, in Shakin, the court held 
that since this was not a criminal proceeding, the corpus 
delicti did not have to be established and that the admissions 
of any party could be relied upon in the absence of independ-
ent evidence to support the agency's findings and decisions with 
respect to the charges of unprofessional conduct. In Goss v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles,4 the court held that the charges 
of the agency might be proved simply by the licensee's testi-
mony. 
In Arenstein the court held that the agency might take offi-
cial notice that drugs referred to by their brand names were 
dangerous drugs within the meaning of Business and Profes-
sions Code section 4211.5 Usually the agency has the burden 
of making sure that an intelligible record of formal proceedings 
at an adjudicatory hearing has been prepared. In the case 
of County of Madera v. Holcomb, supra, this same question 
3. 254 Cal. App.2d at 110, 62 Cal. 4. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 281, app. dismd. 390 U.S . .110, 447 (1968). 
19 L.Ed.2d 1272,88 S.C!. 1112. 5. See Cal. Government Code 
~ 11515. 
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was raised with regard to the sufficiency of the administrative 
record which had been prepared from a phonographic taping 
rather than by stenographic reporter. The court, however, 
while noting that portions of the record were labeled "inaud-
ible", noted that the balance of the record, in accordance 
with the statute, was sufficient for the purpose of the trial 
court and was not so unintelligible as to require reversal. 
The Decision-making Process 
There have been a few cases dealing with the process by 
which decisions are reached. The court in Wilhelm v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Board,6 emphasized that while 
an agency may not believe all the evidence presented, it still 
has the duty to reach substantial understanding of the record; 
accordingly, it cannot disregard testimony and hold in effect 
that there is no such evidence. This is a problem encountered 
by an agency deciding a case on reconsideration or, acting 
under Government Code section 11517, subdivision (c), de-
ciding the case itself after rejecting the hearing officer's pro-
posed decision. The problem in Wilhelm stems from the 
semantic trap of saying "there is no evidence" when one really 
means "the evidence lacks sufficient convincing power". W il-
helm, however, has one additional point not often raised. 
Due process does not require the agency to hear a petition 
for reconsideration in the presence of counsel. 
In Cooper v. State Board oj Medical Examiners/ the 
supreme court held that where the members of the Board 
of Medical Examiners sat and heard a case and some of 
the members' terms expired and they were replaced by new 
members, the latter, after reading the administrative record, 
could, with the remaining members who heard the case, decide 
it. A local body, however, may find itself unable to operate 
in this manner if local law specifically provides that only 
those present at the hearing may vote. 8 
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 30, 62 Cal. Rptr. 8. Rigley v. Board of Retirement, 
829 (1967). 260 Cal. App.2d 445,67 Cal. Rptr. 185 
7. 35 Cal.2d 242, 217 P.2d 630, 18 (1968). 
A.L.R.2d 593 (1950). 
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Questions have often been raised as to the propriety of 
making changes in administrative decisions. A real estate 
broker had a license allowing him to operate under two busi-
ness names at two locations. By mistake the order of revoca-
tion specified only one of the business names. In Russ v. 
Smith,9 the court approved of the commissioner's entering a 
nunc pro tunc order a month later making the decision appli-
cable to both names. A revocation affecting only one loca-
tion or name was no revocation at all, reasoned the court. 
The court noted that the disciplinary proceeding was in per-
sonam against the licensee, not in rem against the license. 
Where on one set of facts pleaded, proven and found, the 
Registrar of Contractors asserted grounds for disciplinary ac-
tion under three code sections, the court in McNeil's Inc. v. 
Contractors State License Board, supra, held that if the find-
ings supported a charge of misconduct under anyone of the 
code sections, the fact that the other two sections were in-
cluded was of no consequence. Although Government Code 
section 11518 separates an administrative decision into three 
parts-findings of fact, determination of issues, and recom-
mendations-the court in McNeil's Inc., held that the segre-
gation was of no moment in determining what facts were 
actually found. The court reaffirmed the traditional view 
that findings are to be liberally construed; administrative find-
ings need not be stated with the formality required of judicial 
findings; the doctrine of implied findings is applicable to ad-
ministrative agencies; and findings need not include every 
evidentiary fact in dispute. 
Although agencies created by the constitution may issue 
decisions to which the doctrine of res judicata may apply,lO 
decisions of non-constitutional state-wide administrative agen-
cies do not have this effect.ll 
9. 264 Cal. App.2d -,70 Cal. Rptr. Cal. Rptr. 104, 106-107,361 P.2d 712, 
813 (1968). 714-715 (1961). 
10. Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Depart- 11. Pratt v. Local 683, 260 Cal. App. 
ment of ABC, 55 Cal.2d 728, 732, 13 2d 545, 67 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1968). 
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Driver's License-Implied Consent Law 
The period under review saw the settling of some basic 
issues relating to the implied consent law, the popular name 
given to California Vehicle Code section 13353. 
By way of background to a discussion of the California 
implied consent law, it should be noted that yearly some 
53,000 people die on the nation's highways and that approxi-
mately one-half of all auto fatalities involve the drunken 
driver. 12 The California Highway Patrol reports that the 
drinking driver was observed in one-third of all fatal traffic 
accidents in 1966, which involved some 1,534 victims in 
1,311 accidents.13 In People v. Sudduth,14 the Supreme Court 
of this state seemed to encourage the use of scientific aids 
such as breathalyzers to determine the question of intoxica-
tion, a question otherwise dependent upon fallible human 
observation. Perhaps the purpose of the implied consent 
law is to create a system by which one either takes the test 
or faces the consequences of suspension of this driving license. 
This system, of course, removes any necessity to use physical 
force on the suspect and prevents the struggle likely to arise 
when an intoxicated driver refuses to do what the peace officer 
effecting the arrest insists he is bound to do. 15 Cases such 
as Sudduth also recognize that there is a certain fairness 
about employing scientific aids to intoxication detection be-
cause these aids not only have the ability to prove guilt but 
also innocence. California has recognized the taking of blood 
samples even though the person has not consented as far 
back as People v. Duroncelay;16 and Schmerber v. California, 
advanced that recognition even more.17 On the other hand, 
there were theoretkal limits beyond which the peace officers 
12. Kelner, Highway Murder, New 
Republic, p. 13, Sept. 2, 1967. 
13. Report of California Highway 
Patrol Department on Fatal and Injury 
Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents, 1966, 
pp. 6, 10-11 (1967). 
14. 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 
421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. den. 389 U.S. 
850, 19 L.Ed.2d 119, 88 S.Ct. 43. 
15. Weinstein, Chemical Tests for 111-
toxicatioll, 45 Journal Criminal Law & 
Criminology, 541, 543 (1954-55). 
16. 48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 
( 1957). 
17. 384 U.S. 757, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 
86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966). 
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could not use the offer of force to extract blood samples.ls 
Accordingly, a statute was needed to provide a systematic 
and orderly method for approaching the subject in an attempt 
to arrive at a method of getting a blood sample without trial 
by battle.19 
Thus the implied consent law took effect in 1966. By 1967 
a multitude of cases were filed in the superior courts under 
section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure to review the 
action of the Department of Motor Vehicles suspending driv-
ers' licenses for six months, pursuant to provisions of the new 
law. Superior court rulings with respect to the law varied 
not only from superior court to superior court, but the clash 
in ideas among the judges within a given superior court was 
notable. Hence, the decisions which were handed down by 
the appellate courts, particularly in the summer of 1968, have 
proved quite helpful in resolving the issues involved. 
What the New Law Entails. Pursuant to Vehicle Code 
Section 13353, the Department of Motor Vehicles may sus-
pend the driving privileges of a person if (1) the person 
was arrested for any offense committed while driving on a 
public highway under the influence of intoxicating liquors; 
(2) a peace officer had reasonable cause to believe the person 
had been driving on a public highway while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor; and (3) the person has been 
advised that the failure to submit to a chemical test to deter-
mine the alcoholic content of his blood would result in the 
suspension of his driving privileges for a period of six months. 
Under the statute the person who has been arrested and re-
quested to submit to the chemical test has a choice of tests-
blood, breath or urine. If the person refuses to submit to 
the test, the peace officer, having reasonable cause to believe 
that the person was driving a motor vehicle on the highway 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, submits a 
sworn statement to the Department of Motor Vehicles show-
18. People v. Barton, 261 Cal. App. 
2d 561, 564, 68 Cal. Rptr. 157, 159-160 
(1968). 
19. Rausenbush, Constitutionality ill 
Wisconsill of Compulsory Scientific 
328 CAL LAW 1969 
Tests for Intoxication, Wisconsin Law 
Review, pp. 251,259 (1953). See Vir-
ginia's Implied Consent Statute, a Sur-
rey and Appraisal, Virginia Law Re-
view, pp. 386, 397 (1963). 
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ing his reasonable cause and the refusal of the person to 
submit to the test. The department thereupon issues its 
order suspending the driving privileges of the individual for 
six months. The statute affords the driver an opportunity 
for a hearing upon a timely request. A timely request for 
a hearing stays the order of suspension and the matter is set 
for hearing on four issues: (1) whether there was an arrest; 
(2) whether there was reasonable cause to believe the person 
was driving on a highway while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor; (3) whether there was a refusal to submit 
to the test; and (4) whether the driver was told that his 
driving privileges would be suspended if he refused to take 
the test. The Department of Motor Vehicles, at the conclu-
sion of the hearing, makes its order and findings and either 
revokes or affirms the action to suspend. 
Implied Consent v. Constitutional Protections. Although 
the constitutional question with regard to the right to counsel 
with respect to the taking of these tests would appear to 
have been answered clearly in cases such as United States v. 
Billy Joe Wade,20 Schmerber, and People v. Sudduth, supra, 
attorneys continued to press the issue sometimes gaining sur-
prising success in the superior courts. Accordingly, the cases 
involving the implied consent law were also cases that had 
more definitive statements to make with regard to the right 
to counsel as well as with regard to the allied right against 
self-incrimination when one was confronted with the request 
to submit to a chemical test. In Finley v. Orr/ the court 
took up the questions of the right to counsel and the right 
against self-incrimination. Principally on the authority of 
Schmerber, the court held that there was no infringement of 
the right against self-incrimination in requiring submission to 
a chemical test under the implied consent law, there being 
no testimonial compulsion. Likewise in Fallis v. Department 
of Motor Vehicles,2 the court held that there was no right 
either under the First or Fifth Amendments of the United 
20. 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 
87 S.O. 1926 (1967). 
1. 262 Cal. App.2d 656, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
137 (19681. 
2. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
595 (1968). For further discussion of 
this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, in this volume. 
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States Constitution to remain silent in the face of a request 
to submit to a chemical test. Finley also held that there was 
no right to counsel at the time the police demanded that the 
driver submit to a chemical test. Although the court in 
Finley did not rely on the decision in United States v. Billy 
Joe Wade, the court might have referred to that authority 
for the proposition that at the stage that a chemical test is 
requested a critical stage in the criminal proceeding has not 
been reached so as to require the protection of the rights 
secured by the Miranda case. The court also took pains 
to mention the case of People v. Ellis,s wherein the defendant 
claimed that he was confused by the giving of the Miranda 
warning, which in effect told him that he could be quiet, and 
the request by the police officer that he speak. In that case 
his speech was required for voice identification. In Finley, 
the court noted that in Ellis there may have been a certain 
similarity between speech in terms of speech for conversation 
and speech for voice identification, but in the case where the 
fellow is asked to take the test, as in Finley, and the man 
refuses, his refusal is not really remaining silent and hence, 
the strong indication is that there is no confusion between the 
Miranda warnings and his duties under the implied consent 
law. Finley also stands for the proposition that since the 
proceedings concerning driver's license suspensions are civil 
in nature, no person then has the right to counsel upon request 
to submit to the test. 
In the case of Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 4 the 
court noted that there was no right to counsel and, relying 
on Fallis, held that one was not entitled to counsel before 
deciding which test to take. The court made it clear that it 
was rejecting the licensee's contention that she needed and 
was entitled to the advice of counsel in choosing which of 
the three tests to take. The court also decided in Ent that 
the police had no duty to warn the driver that she had no 
right to counsel at such time. The driver in Ent relied almost 
entirely on People v. Ellis in making this contention. The 
3. 65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 4. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
421 P.2d 393 (1966). 726 (1968). 
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court rejected the contention on two grounds: (1) there was 
nothing in the record to indicate that the police ever attempted 
to carry out a process of interrogation lending itself to elicit-
ing incriminating statements or that the Miranda or any similar 
warning was ever given or required; and (2) that on the 
basis of footnote 14 in People v. Ellis5 even if the warning 
were given it could not mislead the driver into believing 
she had the right to counsel because what was sought was 
evidence of other physical characteristics, not voice or voice 
characteristics or voice identification. 
Thus, the courts have spoken rather clearly and forcefully 
on the issue of the right to counsel. So definite have the courts 
been that in Fallis the court held that where the individual 
said that he would not take the test without his attorney or 
doctor being present, there was a refusal. The statement was 
made that any equivocal refusal may be interpreted as a re-
fusal. The court in Finley took up the question of condi-
tional consent, i.e., consent to take the test if an attorney 
or doctor is present; the court concluded that a driver, when 
requested to take the required test, cannot impose a condition 
that a doctor of his own choice be present during the taking 
of the test and, impliedly, no condition as to the presence 
of his attorney can be imposed either. 
What Constitutes "Refusal". In Ent v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, the trial court had indicated that the petitioner had 
not refused to take the test but in essence only asked that 
the taking of the test be delayed until her attorney could be 
present. In its conclusion of law the trial court stated that 
the reply to the officer's request only amounted to delay and 
did not amount to a refusal under California law. The appel-
late court, however, found that a refusal had taken place. 
One of the considerations which is present throughout all 
of these cases, including People v. Sudduth, is the idea that 
the law should not encourage any refusal that might operate 
to suppress evidence of intoxication which disappears rapidly 
with the passage of time. 
5. 65 Cal.2d at 539, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 
390, 421 P.2d at 398. 
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In considering the question of a consent conditioned upon 
the test being administered by the licensee's physician, the 
courts, as we have noted, have treated this as a refusal. The 
statutory scheme provides for what might be referred to as 
the "police test" under section 13353 of the California Vehicle 
Code. 6 However, the law also provides for what may be re-
ferred to as the "additional test" under Vehicle Code section 
13354, which recognizes the right of a driver to procure his 
own, and additional, test. Thus, the court in Fallis was able 
to perceive that the test administered by the driver's own physi-
cian was the additional test guaranteed by section 13354 and 
that this was not the test which the police were entitled to under 
section 13353. In so recognizing, the court had before it good 
authority from both New York and South Dakota.7 It will 
be noted also that the court in Fallis struck down the assertion 
by the licensee that he was suffering from some malady which 
prevented him from submitting to a chemical test of his 
blood. While the court did not explain it further, it appeared 
that if the individual were suffering from some malady which 
made it impossible for him to submit to a blood test, he stilI had 
the choice of the other two tests. While it might be within 
the realm of possibility that some condition might prevent him 
from submitting to the urine test, it is hard to imagine a 
viable driver who could not breathe. 
Perhaps, one of the more unique defenses raised was the 
defense of being too drunk to refuse. In Bush v. Bright,S the 
superior court held the driver in question was so far gone that 
he was rendered incapable of refusal. Part of the problem 
was raised by that portion of section 13353 which states that: 
Any person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in 
a condition rendering him incapable of refusal shall be 
deemed not to have withdrawn his consent. 
It might be noted that his consent is the implied consent one 
gives to such a test by driving on the highway. It has been 
6. People v. Dawson, 184 Cal. App. Beare v. Smith (S.D.) 140 N.W.2d 603, 
2d Supp. 881, 7 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1960). 607 (1966). 
7. Sowa v. Hults, 22 App. Div. 2d 8. 264 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 
730,253 N.Y.S.2d 294. 295-296 (1964); 123 (1968). 
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contended that this provlSlon was intended to provide that 
the person arrested would have certain inalienable rights 
and that the legislature being aware of these rights wanted 
to give the driver an opportunity to make a reasonable choice 
or waiver. However, the court indicated that the driver and 
the superior court must construe the nature and purpose of 
the statute. The court was concerned that one might use 
physical force to avoid taking the test, and thus become 
dangerous to himself and those charged with administering it. 
This being so, he is excused from taking the test from his in-
dication of unwillingness, but once he does that he then suffers 
the risk of losing his license. The court held then, that if the 
requirements of section 13353 are otherwise met, regardless 
of the degree of the voluntary intoxication or lack of under-
standing resulting therefrom, when the driver of an auto-
mobile refuses to submit or otherwise manifests an unwilling-
ness to take the test, he is subject to the license suspension 
provisions of the section. As an aside, perhaps in practice, 
one who is incapable of refusal will never be involved in any 
of these cases because the very condition which makes it im-
possible for him to refuse will make it impossible for him to 
drive the automobile. These are points of intoxication never 
quite reached by any of the drivers in these cases. 
In the case of August v. Department of Motor Vehicles,9 
the court had before it a similar issue. In the various sub-
divisions of the opinion, the court carried this heading for one 
of its discussions: "The claim that intoxication rendered 
licensee incapable of intelligently refusing to submit to the 
test does not avert the consequences of the refusal."lO The 
court under this discussion noted that the lack of recollection 
was not inconsistent with the driver's being aware at the 
time of what the officer said to him and what he said to the 
officer and apparently, this was the bulk of the proof ad-
vanced in the case. 
In the case of Zidell v. Bright,n the court had before it a 
9. 264 Cal. App.2d 52, 70 Cal. Rptr. 11. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
172 (1968). 111 (1968). 
10. 264 Cal. App.2d at 67, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. at 182. 
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case where the driver manifested his refusal and some 30 
to 45 minutes later changed his mind. Although the arresting 
officer had left in the interim a telephone call was made to 
him. The officer refused to return, and no test was ever given. 
The court held that there had been a refusal in this situation. 
The court relied on the language in the statute12 to this effect: 
The test shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
reasonable cause to believe such person was driving 
. . . while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.13 
The court said that this language implied that the decision 
of the arresting officer whether to request the test and the 
subject's response thereto should not be delayed. It was 
further contended by the appellant that he had a right to have 
the officer give him a chemical test under subdivision (f) of 
section 13353. The court held that this contention could not 
be sustained. That subdivision was to permit the suspected 
drunk driver to obtain a chemical test only if the arresting 
officer failed to take the initiative. The court concluded that 
the legislature did not add subdivision (f) to give an accused 
drunk driver the right to refuse the officer's request to submit 
to the test and thereafter the right to demand that the test 
be given. The court held further that it would be inconsistent 
with the purpose of the statute to hold that the arresting officer 
or the officers placed in charge of the driver at the police 
station where he was being held, should turn aside from their 
other duties and responsibilities and arrange for the adminis-
tration of the belated test when once there had been a refusal 
after fair warning. A similar situation was presented in Ent 
where the driver's request that her attorney be present resulted 
in a delay of one hour between the time of the request and the 
time the attorney arrived. The court noted, however, that even 
though the delay caused by the respondent's demand for the 
presence of her attorney was a period of only one hour, the 
department would still have the right to suspend her license 
under section 13353. The court relied on Zidell in great part 
12. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 13. Cal. Vehicle Code § 13353 sub-
Rptr. at 112-113. division (a). 
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as well as the language appearing in Sudduth that the evidence 
of intoxication disappears rapidly with the passage of time and 
therefore, a refusal that might operate to suppress such evi-
dence should not be encouraged as a device to escape prose-
cution. 
These implied consent cases also dispose of some other pro-
cedural matters which are of interest to the lawyer practicing 
in the administrative law field. In Finley, the court once again 
sought to inter the perennial contention that a judicial func-
tion was delegated to an administrative department, thus de-
priving the licensee of due process. The licensee was 
particularly concerned with the question of determining 
whether the peace officer had a reasonable cause. This de-
termination was delegated to the department. Citing the 
case of Escobedo v. State oj Calijornia,14 the court held that 
this was not an invalid delegation of judicial power to the ad-
ministrative agency. It was next urged by the licensee in 
Finley that he was denied an impartial hearing. He argued 
that the department acted as both the accuser and judge. 
The court, on the strength of Hohreiter v. Garrison/5 held that 
the contention was not only improper but that there was 
nothing in the record to indicate that the driver was not 
afforded a fair hearing. 
In Serenko v. Bright/6 the driver contended that section 
13353 was not applicable to her because she had been issued 
her driving license prior to the enactment of the section. She 
contended that the application of the section, insofar as it 
attempted to proceed on the concept of implied consent, was a 
retroactive application which she believed to be unconstitu-
tional. The court pointed out that it was not the act of ob-
taining the driver's license which brought the statute into 
play, but that it was the act of driving from which the 
driver's implied consent to the chemical test flowed. The 
statute, the court said, was broad enough to encompass all 
14. 35 Cal.2d 870, 877,222 P.2d 1, 6 16. 263 Cal. App.2d 682, 70 Cal. 
(1950). Rptr. I (1968). 
15. 81 Cal. App.2d 384, 392-393, 
184 P.2d 323, 328-329 (1947). 
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drivers on California highways whether licensed by California, 
other jurisdictions, or even if unlicensed. The licensee noted 
that she had pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of violating 
Vehicle Code section 23102, subdivision (a) ("drunk driv-
ing") and that the traffic court, pursuant to Vehicle Code 
section 13352, had recommended that there be no suspension. 
Based upon this, the licensee argued that her license should 
not be suspended. The court noted that section 13353 was 
not a section which was based on section 13352 at all, the 
latter section providing for the suspension of the driving 
privileges on certain convictions of driving while intoxicated. 
Section 13353 is not predicated upon driving while intoxi-
cated or even on conviction therefor, but is predicated on re-
fusal to submit to the chemical test. Moreover, the duty of 
the department to suspend the license for six months is clear; 
the statute's use of the word "shall" makes it a mandatory 
duty rather than a discretionary act on the part of the de-
partment. Thus, the fact that the person in Serenko subse-
quently pleaded guilty or that the court recommended no 
suspension had no effect on the proceedings under section 
13353. Thus, the court indicated that the arrestee, by sub-
sequent guilty plea, had no power to avoid retroactively the 
consequences of his or her earlier refusal to cooperate. It 
was also contended that the licensee in Serenko, was prejudiced 
because her case did not come up for hearing within the 15 
day period provided for in section 13353; but the court noted 
that the section also provided that if the case was not heard 
within the 15-day period, the suspension should not take 
place until the department had ultimately decided the case; 
thus, there was no prejudice by delay. 
Hearing Procedures Under the New Law. The application 
of the implied consent law not only brought about the in-
teresting divergent comments of the superior courts with re-
gard to the substantive problems involved but also brought 
into sharp focus for examination the hearing procedures of 
the Department of Motor Vehicles. Basically, the hearing 
procedures of the department involved either a formal hearing 
procedure conducted substantially pursuant to the provisions 
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of the Administrative Procedure Act,17 or an informal hearing 
procedure conducted pursuant to the Vehicle Code section 
14104, which contemplates that the hearing be conducted in 
a completely informal manner. The constitutionality of these 
hearing procedures has been commented upon briefly in the 
case of Hough v. McCarthy/8 and Beamon v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles. 19 
It is in this area that the chief importance of the Serenko 
case lies, for that case decided that the person conducting 
the hearings for the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to 
Vehicle Code section 14107 need not be a hearing officer 
possessing the same qualifications as a hearing officer con-
templated by the Administrative Procedure Act. 20 In formal 
hearings held by the Department of Motor Vehicles, the referee 
hearing the matter for the department need not be a lawyer. 
The court, among other things, noted a very salient distinction 
between proceedings arising under the provisions of the 
Vehicle Code,1 and cases governed entirely by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Among other things, section 14107 
of the Vehicle Code provides that formal hearings may be 
conducted by the director of that department, by a referee or 
by a hearing board appointed by him consisting of officers 
or employees of the department. Although the Vehicle Code 
section 14112 provides that the Administrative Procedure Act 
is applicable to those matters not covered by the Vehicle Code, 
the court held that which of these three was to hear these 
cases was determined by the Vehicle Code and hence, that 
portion of the Administrative Procedure Act which defined 
the qualifications of the hearing officer would not be appli-
cable to these proceedings. The court pointed out something 
else which is often times overlooked not only by practitioners 
but by the courts. The inclusion of an agency in the list of 
agencies under the Code2 does not necessarily make the pro-
17. Cal. Vehicle Code § 14112. 
18. 54 Ca1.2d 273, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668, 
353 P.2d 276 (1960). 
19. 180 Cal. App.2d 200, 4 Cal. Rptr. 
396 (1960). 
22 
20. Cal. Government Code §§ 11500 
et seq. 
1. Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 14100-
14112. 
2. Cal. Government Code § 11501 
(b). 
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visions of the Code applicable to those agencies therein listed. 
Section 1 150 I of the Government Code expressly provides 
that the procedure of any agency shall be conducted under 
the provisions of the chapter (Administrative Procedure Act) 
"only as to those functions relating to the particular agency." 
In this connection, the cases of Bertch v. Social Welfare De-
partment,3 and Taliaferro v. Insurance Commission,4 cited by 
the court might well be read by those persons who are not 
aware of the purpose of the listing of agencies under Code 
section 11501(b). 
It should be noted that most of the procedure at a formal 
hearing is provided by the Administrative Procedure Act while 
the informal hearing is governed by Vehicle Code section 
14104. Whether the proceedings before the department will 
be formal or informal is determined by the driver himself. 
For when the driver makes the request for a hearing under 
Vehicle Code section 13353, subdivision (c), he then indi-
cates what kind of hearing he desires. Normally, the informa-
tion supplied to him by the department indicates that if he 
does not select a particular type of hearing, an informal hearing 
will be given to him. The court, in the August case indicated 
that the sworn statement of the peace officer may be used 
as evidence in these informal hearings. The court in that 
case concluded that the taking of oral testimony has not been 
made a prerequisite to the validity of an informal hearing be-
fore the department in the absence of timely objection to the 
admission of hearsay. The court pointed out the sworn state-
ment could have the dignity of prima facie evidence in an in-
formal hearing when received without objection and without 
a request to cross-examine the peace officer making the state-
ment. The court adhered to the rule established in Griswold 
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,5 that the failure 
to make an objection is deemed to be a waiver of objection, 
3. 45 Cal.2d 524, 527, 289 P.2d 485, 5. 141 Cal. App.2d 807, 810-811, 
487 (1955). 297 P.2d 762, 763-764 (1956). 
4. 142 Cal. App.2d 487, 489, 298 
P.2d 914, 916 (1956), cert. den. 352 
U.S. 972, 1 L.Ed.2d 325, 77 S.Ct. 362. 
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and the court treated this as being a waiver of the objection 
to the hearsay nature of the evidence. 
It will be noted that Griswold involved a hearing under the 
Administrative Procedure Act with all the trappings, and then 
some, of a formal hearing. Thus, the question of the failure 
to object would seem to be immaterial as to the type of 
proceeding. The court seemed to reason in the August case 
that the testimony of the licensee and that of his witness could 
fill in the gaps to bring about the requisite evidentiary support 
for the department's decision. The difficulty with August 
is that while it attempts to explore various rights, procedural 
and otherwise, with respect to the holdings of these hearings 
and attempts to define rules governing the nature of the 
evidence to be required, it seems to come up with no clear 
application of such rules and with no full analysis of Vehicle 
Code section 14104. On the facts of the case the court seems 
to have arrived at the proper result. In passing it will also 
be noted that this case, too, stands for the proposition that 
what happens in the criminal action is unrelated to this 
type of proceeding, a plea of guilty in the criminal matter not 
vitiating the refusal in the implied consent case. 
In Fallis, the court had before it an informal hearing. The 
court concluded that the informal hearing process permitted 
the department to treat the sworn statement as prima facie 
evidence as to any matter in which there was no conflicting 
evidence. The court, however, indicated that an arrest re-
port and a supplemental report might not serve as evidence in 
these cases. This holding is interesting because even in formal 
hearings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
hearsay is admissible. 6 Further, in light of the fact that under 
section 14104, specific rules of evidence are laid down anyway; 
so long as the matter is conducted in the purely informal 
manner contemplated, there should have been no reason why 
hearsay of a reliable type should not have been introduced, 
used, and relied upon in such hearings. 
In the Goss case, the court had before it the problem of a 
formal hearing where the matter of hearsay was regulated 
6. Cal. Government Code § l1S13(c). 
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by Government Code section 11513. The court noted that 
while the sworn statement and two police arrest reports were 
all hearsay, they were admissible to supplement and explain 
other admissible testimony. The court noted that the licensee 
was called and his own testimony gave him away; hence, the 
hearsay documents which the court mentioned were all com-
petent to supplement and explain the driver's testimony pur-
suant to section 11513 (c). 
During the period of time with which we deal there have 
been other cases which the appellate courts have cited in this 
implied consent field, but the the decisions in such cases have 
been certified for non-publication. While some of these cases 
represented well-established points, some have also presented 
interesting extensions of many of the points established by the 
cases commented upon here. It is a pity that the device of 
certification for non-publication essentially deprives the prac-
titioners of the benefit of those decisions. Especially is this 
critical to the administrative agency that would like to rely on 
those cases but cannot cite them in court. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
In commenting on Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of 
Guide Dogs for the Blind, supra, we have already had occasion 
to note the general subject of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies as commented on by the courts throughout the year. 
The courts still state the general proposition that where an 
administrative remedy is provided by this statute, relief must 
be sought from the administrative body and this remedy ex-
hausted before the court will act. Compliance with this rule 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.7 The 
case of Hollon v. Pierce,s presented an interesting application 
of the doctrine. In that case the petitioner sought to compeJ 
reinstatement by his employer, the Shasta Union High School 
District. He alleged that the district had discharged him 
7. McLeod v. City of Los Angeles, 8. 257 Cal. App.2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
256 Cal. App.2d 693, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967). For further discussion of 
394 (1967). this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, in this volume. 
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because of his religious beliefs. The school district, after 
some allegedly unstable behavior by the petitioner, held an 
executive session and adopted a resolution withholding renewal 
of the petitioner's contract for the forthcoming school year. 
They did, however, offer to review any psychiatric examination 
he might obtain. The petitioner then filed a complaint with 
the State Fair Employment Practices Commission9 which con-
ducted an examination. The Commission received two 
psychiatric reports, neither of them indicating petitioner to 
be maladjusted, disoriented, psychotic, or dangerous. The 
evidence before the appellate court indicated that as time went 
on the State Fair Employment Practices Commission seemed 
to have dropped the matter. 
The court indicated that a statute investing a public agency 
with supervisory or investigatory power affords an adminis-
trative remedy when it establishes clearly defined machinery 
for the submission, evaluation, and resolution of complaints 
by aggrieved parties. In this connection, the remedy before 
the State Fair Employment Practices Commission was deemed 
to be an administrative remedy within the rule and one which 
petitioner had to exhaust before seeking judicial review. 
Thus, the case stands for the proposition that the adminis-
trative remedy may very well be one which is afforded by some 
administrative agency wholly outside of the contemplated 
machinery involving the agency whose acts are in question. 
The court in Hol/on, however, avoided any real problem in 
the case by holding that there had been an exhaustion of the 
remedy before the Fair Employment Practices Commission 
because, although the proceedings before the commission did 
not reach the point of completion by rejection of the com-
plaint, or rendition of a final order, it did come to a complete 
halt. The administrative machinery had stopped, and the 
court reasoned that theoretically the complaining employee 
might have brought a mandate action with the objective of 
compelling the commission to act further. Such a lawsuit 
would have been expensive and would have entailed delay; 
thus, the court reasoned that the rule of resort to the adminis-
9. Cal. Labor Code § 1414. 
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trative agency only demanded exhaustion of the remedies not 
the attrition of the litigant. 
The courts also continued to hold that the court will not 
consider for the first time on judicial review points not pre-
sented to the agency. Thus where a petition for reconsidera-
tion is available in a Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board 
proceeding, the court will not consider for the first time points 
not presented in the applicant's petition for reconsideration. 10 
The rule would be somewhat modified with regard to cases 
involving agencies governed by the Administrative Procedure 
Act because Government Code section 11523 expressly pro-
vides that a petition for reconsideration is not a condition 
precedent to seeking judicial review. However, even as to 
those agencies which operate under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the courts have still indicated their disenchantment 
with litigants who do not present those points for consideration 
to the agency where there is that kind of availability.ll 
In Reimel v. House,t2 the court expressed its displeasure with 
a decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 
a board to which appeals from decisions of the Department 
of Alcoholic Beverage Control are taken. In that case, the 
appeals board decided an issue neither presented at the hear-
ing before the department nor even presented in the appeal 
before the appeals board. The court held that since the issue 
was not properly raised at the hearing before the department, 
it was not before the board. This is another application of the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies used in a 
setting where an administrative tribunal is used as an appellate 
body over another administrative tribunal. 
Public Employees and Administrative Law 
During the year a number of cases involving public em-
ployees at all levels-city, county, and state-have been de-
10. Heath v. Workmen's Camp. App. 
Bd., 254 Cal. App.2d 235, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
139 (1967). 
11. Reimel v. ABC Appeals Board, 
256 Cal. App.2d 158, 175, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
342 CAL LAW 1969 
26,35-36 (1967), app. dismd. 393 U.S. 
7, 21 L.Ed.2d 9, 89 S.O. 44. 
12. 259 Cal. App.2d 511, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 434 (1968), app. dismd. 393 U.S. 
17, 21 L.Ed.2d 17, 89 S.O. 48. 
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cided. The court in Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil 
Service,13 restated the rule concerning public employment that 
although it is not a constitutional right, one cannot be prop-
erly barred from public employment for arbitrary, unreason-
able, and capricious reasons. The court in Hofberg showed 
its unwillingness to impose conditions of employment which 
improperly impair the exercise of basic constitutional rights. 
In proceeding along these lines, the court was dealing with a 
petitioner who had sometime previously been discharged from 
county employment because he asserted the Fifth Amendment 
privilege in an appearance before the House of Representa-
tives' Committee on Un-American Activities. Subsequently, 
and at a date closer to the institution of the proceedings, the 
employee sought employment by the agency, disclosed the 
particulars of his prior employment and reasons for discharge, 
and passed a written examination. His name was withheld 
from the eligible lists, however, under a rule which stated that 
an applicant's name might be withheld from the employment 
list if that person had been dismissed for cause. 
In appealing this decision, the petitioner indicated his will-
ingness to answer any questions asked by the County of Los 
Angeles or the Civil Service Commission which he had pre-
viously refused to answer before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee. He further indicated that in response 
to a request that if called upon he would appear before the 
HUAC but that on advice of counsel, predicated on Fifth 
Amendment grounds, he would refuse to answer any questions 
except those set out in Government Code section 1028.1 (re-
lating to subversive activities). He added, however, that he 
would appear before any State Assembly Committee or Senate 
Committee and answer any questions. The court noted the 
expansion of constitutional rights of public employees over the 
years and the corresponding restrictions on the conditions 
which could be imposed on employment and concluded there 
was no substantial element of utility to support the Civil 
Service Commission's decision in denying reemployment. The 
13. 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 65 Cal. sion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTI-
Rptr. 759 (1968). For further discus- TUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
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court stressed petitioner's willingness to answer any questions 
by any local or state body and his willingness, except with the 
limitation here noted, to questions posed by the HUAC. The 
only refusal present was related to a possible future refusal 
to answer some unknown questions at a hypothetical hear-
ing. 
In Board of Trustees of the Placerville Union School District 
v. Porini,14 the court held that in an action to dismiss a school 
teacher as being mentally incompetent, the judgment sup-
porting a requirement that the teacher take a two-year leave 
of absence was unsupported where all the evidence of in-
competence related to a time period sixteen months prior to 
the date of trial, and no evidence showed that she suffered any 
incapacity at the time of trial and where there was some evi-
dence produced by the teacher to the contrary. 
In Orlandi v. State Personnel Board,15 a traffic officer was 
dismissed under Government Code section 19572, subdivision 
(t) (failure of good behavior of such nature that it causes dis-
credit to the employee's agency or his employment). The 
dismissal, which arose out of the officer's fixing of a traffic 
ticket, was upheld although there was no actual proof pre-
sented that the crime actually resulted in damage to the repu-
tation of the California Highway Patrol, and although there 
was no showing that the conduct was publicized. The statu-
tory provision dealt with conduct of state employees and not 
with the extent of publicity that the conduct may attract. The 
officer's conduct was clearly the sort of behavior which would 
discredit the highway patrol and bring discredit to its officers. 
Licensing-Nature of Licenses and Effect of Non-
licensing 
In Johnson v. Maddox,16 the court held that where a license 
is required by statute before a certain activity, such as con-
14. 263 Cal. App.2d 784, 70 Cal. 15. 263 Cal. App.2d 32, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 73 (1968). For a further discus- Rptr. 177 (1968). 
sion of this case, see McKinstry, STATE 16. Johnson v. Maddox, 257 Cal. 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this App.2d 714, 65 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1968). 
volume. 
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tracting, may be engaged in, an unlicensed person who con-
tracts to do that for which a license is required may not 
recover on his contract. This case presented nothing par-
ticularly new, but the federal courts in Power City Communi-
cations Inc. v. Calaveras Telephone Co./7 provided an in-
teresting twist on the application of the rule. In that case the 
district court held that in view of the rule in Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins,18 the California statute prohibiting a contractor 
from bringing and maintaining an action to collect com-
pensation for any act or contract for which a license is required 
without alleging and proving that it was a duly licensed con-
tractor was determinative as to whether or not a Washington 
corporation was empowered to sue in a diversity action for in-
stallation and construction of telephone facilities in Cali-
fornia. This California rule was the one to be followed rather 
than the usual federal rule providing that the capacity of a 
corporation to sue or be sued is to be determined by the law 
under which it was organized. 
17. 280 F.Supp. 808 (D.C. [1968]). 18. 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 58 
S.C!. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938). 
'" 
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